Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90156-1zbMath0653.90010OpenAlexW2069201655MaRDI QIDQ1108174

Pierre de Trenqualye

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90156-1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityNash equilibriapublic good economyCournot best-replay behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (3)

Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem

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