A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90042-XzbMath0654.90108OpenAlexW2014550611MaRDI QIDQ1108949

Jean-Pierre Benoît

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90042-x

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitytrigger strategiesfinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmanon-equilibrium approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

A note on the equilibria of the unbounded traveler's dilemma ⋮ Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end ⋮ Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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