Symmetry, voting, and social choice

DOI10.1007/BF03026639zbMath0656.90002MaRDI QIDQ1110424

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Mathematical Intelligencer (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityArrow's theoremalgebraic point of viewBorda's rulewreath product of groups

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Symmetric groups (20B30)

Related Items

Abelian symmetry groups in social choice, The aggregated excess demand function and other aggregation procedures, Dictionaries, Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem, Consistency of decision processes, The Borda dictionary

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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