Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
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Publication:1110430
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90255-4zbMath0656.90013OpenAlexW2030177837MaRDI QIDQ1110430
Alvin E. Roth, Marilda Sotomayor
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90255-4
corelattice structurethreatsset of stable outcomesstable feasible payoffsymmetrically pairwise-bargained payofftwo-sided matching market
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