On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90012-9zbMath0656.90109OpenAlexW2084688973MaRDI QIDQ1110466

George J. Mailath

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90012-9

zbMATH Keywords

measurable functionconvergence theoremsignaling gameseparating Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (4)

Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games ⋮ A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games ⋮ Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection ⋮ Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

Cites Work

• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Sequential Equilibria

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