The structure of neutral monotonic social functions

DOI10.1007/BF00433363zbMath0658.90008OpenAlexW2030668793MaRDI QIDQ1111904

Julian H. Blau, Donald J. Brown

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433363

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functionsfilterultrafilterdirect sumcyclic preferencesacyclic gameshierarchy of dictatorshierarchy of oligarchiesneutral monotonic social functionsoverlapping simple gamesquasi-transitive social decision functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions ⋮ Information, associativity, and choice requirements ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Semisimple games, enactment power and generalized power indices ⋮ Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms ⋮ Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions. ⋮ Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings ⋮ There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think

Cites Work

• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Constructing block designs of elements or residue rings with a composite modulus
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Majority Voting and Social Choice
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision