Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90129-9zbMath0658.90019OpenAlexW1980441235MaRDI QIDQ1111905

Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90129-9

zbMATH Keywords

local governmentlocal public goods economiesvoting-market equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, \& endogenous institutions ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization

Cites Work

• Existence of voting-market equilibria
• Quasi-equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences
• Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives

This page was built for publication: Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies