Strategic irrationality in extensive games

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90010-8zbMath0658.90110OpenAlexW2162564816MaRDI QIDQ1111953

Kaushik Basu

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90010-8

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityprisoners' dilemmareasonable strategiessophisticated rationalizable strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) 2-person games (91A05) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

Related Items (7)

On rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games ⋮ Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium ⋮ King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot ⋮ Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

This page was built for publication: Strategic irrationality in extensive games