Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
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Publication:1113782
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90135-4zbMath0661.90008OpenAlexW2028275172MaRDI QIDQ1113782
John McMillan, R. Preston McAfee
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90135-4
Related Items (43)
Selling two identical objects ⋮ Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard ⋮ Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity ⋮ A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening ⋮ Selling two goods optimally ⋮ Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ An optimal auction for complements ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing ⋮ Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions ⋮ General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis ⋮ Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types ⋮ Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms ⋮ The robustness of multidimensional signalling equilibria ⋮ Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources ⋮ Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land ⋮ Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules ⋮ Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly ⋮ Pricing lotteries ⋮ When is multidimensional screening a convex program? ⋮ Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions ⋮ On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items ⋮ Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist ⋮ Haggling over substitutes ⋮ Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness ⋮ Biased procurement auctions ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist ⋮ Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences ⋮ Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities ⋮ The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions ⋮ Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods ⋮ The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design ⋮ Price discrimination and majority voting
Cites Work
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- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
- Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
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