An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90137-8zbMath0661.90105OpenAlexW1997217175MaRDI QIDQ1113813

George J. Mailath

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90137-8

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationprivate informationseparating equilibriumfirst-period actionsone-sides signaling gamessecond-period actionssimultaneous signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (5)

Duopoly signal jamming ⋮ Competition and confidentiality: signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information ⋮ Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket ⋮ Starting small and renegotiation ⋮ A note on yardstick regulation of fishery monopolies

Cites Work

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• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
• Informational Equilibrium
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Sequential Equilibria
• Global inverse function theorems

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