Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(89)90328-7zbMath0663.90007OpenAlexW1990045856MaRDI QIDQ1115327

Kashi R. Balachandran, Joshua Ronen

Publication date: 1989

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(89)90328-7

zbMATH Keywords

subcontractingmoral hazardadverse selectiondecentralizationpricingagencytransfer priceOptimal incentive compensation function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (4)

Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games ⋮ Monotone second-best optimal contracts ⋮ Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm

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