Stopping agents from ``cheating

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90136-6zbMath0666.90019OpenAlexW2145627975MaRDI QIDQ1117129

S. H. Smith

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90136-6

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaincentive compatibilityOptimal incentive compatible mechanismsprincipal/agent modelunique Bayes-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
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