Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90040-6zbMath0666.90095OpenAlexW2022803142MaRDI QIDQ1117149

Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90040-6

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitysufficient conditionsabridgementdecomposition of a symmetric extensive two-person gametop

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) General biology and biomathematics (92B05)

Related Items (11)

The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions ⋮ An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives ⋮ Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests ⋮ Three steps ahead ⋮ Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition ⋮ An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets ⋮ A NEW SEQUENCE FORM APPROACH FOR THE ENUMERATION AND REFINEMENT OF ALL EXTREME NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES ⋮ Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games ⋮ Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games ⋮ COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES

Cites Work

• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development