Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality

DOI10.1007/BF00735765zbMath0666.90096OpenAlexW3125076299WikidataQ59973055 ScholiaQ59973055MaRDI QIDQ1117150

Terje Lensberg, William Thomson

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00735765

zbMATH Keywords

Nash solutionbargainingdisagreement solutionaxiomatic characterizationPareto Optimalityvariable number of agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

Truncated leximin solutions ⋮ Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality ⋮ Bargaining solutions and relative guarantees ⋮ Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution ⋮ No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ A generalization of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions ⋮ Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space ⋮ On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria ⋮ Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

Cites Work

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• Truncated egalitarian solutions
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
• Value Theory Without Efficiency

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