Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
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Publication:1119144
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3zbMath0669.90008OpenAlexW1977248806MaRDI QIDQ1119144
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90030-3
independence of irrelevant alternativesvectorsocial choice functionstrong dominancequasi-dictatorPossibility resultsweak non imposition
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Cites Work
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