A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
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Publication:1119497
DOI10.1007/BF01248494zbMath0671.90107OpenAlexW2091208258WikidataQ114693999 ScholiaQ114693999MaRDI QIDQ1119497
Publication date: 1989
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01248494
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