Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution

DOI10.1007/BF00446985zbMath0672.90008MaRDI QIDQ1120439

S. H. Smith

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

income redistributionpoliticseconomic approach tolegislative seatpressure group sizetax scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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