The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90124-5zbMath0672.90015OpenAlexW2039647999MaRDI QIDQ1120445

Andrew Schotter, Roy Radner

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90124-5

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbargaining mechanismsealed-bid mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information, Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency, Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions, Introduction to a Festschrift for Andrew Schotter, Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games, No trade, On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market, Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment, Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication, How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games, Bilateral trading with naive traders, Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes, Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables, Strategic play and adaptive learning in the sealed-bid bargaining mechanism, The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs, Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem