Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(89)90413-5zbMath0673.90008OpenAlexW1972280639MaRDI QIDQ1121145

Scott L. Feld, Nicholas R. Miller, Bernard Grofman

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90413-5

zbMATH Keywords

spatial voting gameagenda controlyolkpolitical economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive individual preferences over multi-dimensional issues ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension ⋮ The almost surely shrinking yolk ⋮ The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees

Cites Work

• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Stability in Voting
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Unnamed Item