Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule

DOI10.1007/BF00303170zbMath0673.90009WikidataQ57341012 ScholiaQ57341012MaRDI QIDQ1121147

T. M. Zavist, T. Nicolaus Tideman

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

clonesranked pairs voting rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

A comparison between the prudent order and the ranking obtained with Borda's, Copeland's, Slater's and Kemeny's rules ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case ⋮ Self-selective social choice functions ⋮ A characterization of prudent choices ⋮ Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency ⋮ A prudent characterization of the ranked pairs rule ⋮ The clone relation of a binary relation ⋮ Majority rule in the absence of a majority ⋮ A characterization of the prudent order preference function

Cites Work

• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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