Refinements of Nash equilibrium: A critique

DOI10.1007/BF00159222zbMath0673.90098OpenAlexW2086932631MaRDI QIDQ1121184

Robin P. Cubitt

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00159222

zbMATH Keywords

rational strategystrict Nash equilibriumbest reply principleRational playweakly dominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites Work

• On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non- cooperative games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environments
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept