The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory

DOI10.1007/BF00159223zbMath0673.90107OpenAlexW1986788043MaRDI QIDQ1121190

Rudolf Schuessler

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00159223

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionchain store paradoxevolutionary analysisevolutionary degradation effectfinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournament ⋮ Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games

Cites Work

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• The chain-store paradox revisited
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• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Random evolutionarily stable strategies
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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