Bribes, power, and managerial control in corporate voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00134107zbMath0673.90110MaRDI QIDQ1121192

Robert A. Jarrow, J. Chris Leach

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coreShapley values\(\psi\)-stable pairscorporate control transfercorporate voting gamesmanagerial actionsProxy fights

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Operations research and management science (90B99) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Constrained \(n\)-person games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Axioms for Shapley values in games with quarrelling
• Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games

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