Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core

DOI10.1007/BF00134106zbMath0674.90105MaRDI QIDQ1121811

Mark S. Salzer, H. Andrew Michener

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stable settestempty coreimputation set\(\lambda \) - transfer nucleolus\(\lambda \) -transfer valuecooperative non-sidepayment n- person gamesdeterrence setdisruption valueGoodness-of-fit resultspredictive accuracy of solution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core

Cites Work

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• Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core
• Cooperation versus competition
• Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games¹
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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