Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core
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Publication:1121811
DOI10.1007/BF00134106zbMath0674.90105MaRDI QIDQ1121811
Mark S. Salzer, H. Andrew Michener
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
stable settestempty coreimputation set\(\lambda \) - transfer nucleolus\(\lambda \) -transfer valuecooperative non-sidepayment n- person gamesdeterrence setdisruption valueGoodness-of-fit resultspredictive accuracy of solution concepts
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Cites Work
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- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
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