On the existence of fair matching algorithms

DOI10.1007/BF00134111zbMath0675.90074MaRDI QIDQ1122495

F. Masarani, S. Sadik Gokturk

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessStabilitymatching algorithmmarriagejob matchingRawlsian justiceassignment marketsaxiomatic justiceGale- Shapley matching problemMaximin Optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Pareto optimality in coalition formation ⋮ What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ A problem in discrete distributive justice ⋮ Median stable matching for college admissions ⋮ EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED ⋮ Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets

Cites Work

• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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