Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions

DOI10.1007/BF01248496zbMath0675.90109OpenAlexW2065280432MaRDI QIDQ1122519

Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01248496

zbMATH Keywords

non-observable actionsone-shot gamelower equilibrium payoffsundiscounted repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
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