A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games

DOI10.1007/BF01248498zbMath0677.90094OpenAlexW2115485079MaRDI QIDQ1123825

Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01248498

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesssimple gamesmajority gamevoting gamesnon-emptiness of the core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• On Milnor's classes L and D
• On the core of voting games
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• The Core of an N Person Game

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