Smooth social choice

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(89)90414-7zbMath0678.90005OpenAlexW2030272054MaRDI QIDQ1124504

Norman Schofield

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90414-7

zbMATH Keywords

chaoscoreNakamura numbervoting rulesmooth social choicevoting cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• A generalization of Tychonoff's fixed point theorem
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• Structural instability of the core
• On the existence of maximal elements
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments
• Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Differential Topology
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule

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