A new informational base for social choice

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(89)90004-8zbMath0678.90008OpenAlexW2020848516MaRDI QIDQ1124505

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(89)90004-8

zbMATH Keywords

non-manipulabilityminority coalitionnon-manipulable social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Tops-only domains ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Kelly's conjecture

Cites Work

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• Kelly's conjecture
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Special domains and nonmanipulability
• The logic of preference reconsidered
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness

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