On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4zbMath0678.90017OpenAlexW2078610441MaRDI QIDQ1124510

Toshihide Matsuo

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsellerprivate valuesbuyerBayesian incentive computabilityex post efficient mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade, Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs, Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments, Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms, Robust bilateral trade with discrete types, Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values, Collusion-proof and fair auctions, On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading