Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1124541
DOI10.1007/BF01254297zbMath0678.90103OpenAlexW2068895800MaRDI QIDQ1124541
Guillermo Owen, Lloyd S. Shapley
Publication date: 1989
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254297
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
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