Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1124542
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90075-6zbMath0678.90104OpenAlexW1990568943MaRDI QIDQ1124542
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90075-6
coalition-proof Nash equilibriumstrong Nash equilibriaabstract coreabstract stable setnegotiation process
Related Items (10)
Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers ⋮ A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy ⋮ Coalitions, agreements and efficiency ⋮ The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games ⋮ Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games ⋮ Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium ⋮ The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency ⋮ Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games ⋮ Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
