A consistent bargaining set
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Publication:1124543
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0zbMath0678.90105OpenAlexW1981827790MaRDI QIDQ1124543
Rajiv Vohra, Debraj Ray, Bhaskar Dutta, Kunal Sengupta
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0
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