The optimal design of a market

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2536zbMath0956.91039OpenAlexW2028845761MaRDI QIDQ1125565

Sandro Brusco, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 9 March 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d300e49536698c33e9cda7ef64f57f29da4aeaa4

zbMATH Keywords

marketoptimal design of rulesrules of trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
• Discrete pricing and the design of dealership markets
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Toward Natural Implementation

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