Reputation versus social learning

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2538zbMath0952.91014OpenAlexW1987452679MaRDI QIDQ1125566

Matthew O. Jackson, Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 6 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2538

zbMATH Keywords

reputationfinitely repeated gameBayesian recurring gamesequilibrium play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games. ⋮ Learning in Games

Cites Work

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• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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