A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
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Publication:1125569
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2542zbMath0958.91015OpenAlexW2167320298MaRDI QIDQ1125569
Larry G. Epstein, Michael Peters
Publication date: 8 April 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2542
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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