Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power

DOI10.1007/S001990050214zbMath0907.90008OpenAlexW2058025289MaRDI QIDQ1128229

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 10 August 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050214

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis ⋮ An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions

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