Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00262-0zbMath0899.90171OpenAlexW2252781364WikidataQ126982153 ScholiaQ126982153MaRDI QIDQ1128553

Roberto Serrano, Nir Dagan

Publication date: 13 August 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00262-0

zbMATH Keywords

scale invarianceimplementationrandomnessNash programordinal invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium ⋮ On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value ⋮ Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces

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• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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