Standardization and the stability of collusion

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00010-XzbMath0909.90041MaRDI QIDQ1128590

Luca Lambertini, Sougata Poddar, Dan Sasaki

Publication date: 13 August 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

product innovationcritical discount factorRJVs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items

A differential game approach to investment in product differentiation ⋮ Compatibility, network effects, and collusion ⋮ Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition ⋮ PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES TOWARDS INVESTMENT IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION ⋮ Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation ⋮ Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
• Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior