Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00064-0zbMath0911.90043OpenAlexW2033246136WikidataQ127030994 ScholiaQ127030994MaRDI QIDQ1128926

Svend Albæk, Luca Lambertini

Publication date: 13 August 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00064-0

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationCartel stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (3)

Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion? ⋮ Price or quantity in tacit collusion? ⋮ Product differentiation in spatial Cournot markets

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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