Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00103-6zbMath0905.90188OpenAlexW2037640531MaRDI QIDQ1129177

Sjur Didrik Flåm

Publication date: 13 August 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00103-6

zbMATH Keywords

learningnoncooperative gamesmean-value iterates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS, Affine Relaxations of the Best Response Algorithm: Global Convergence in Ratio-Bounded Games, LEARNING TO FACE STOCHASTIC DEMAND, Stochastic mean values, rational expectations, and price movements

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