Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
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Publication:1132745
DOI10.1007/BF01769190zbMath0419.90087OpenAlexW1988716172MaRDI QIDQ1132745
Publication date: 1978
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769190
classification of 2 x 2 bimatrix gamesstrategically equivalent gamesstrategically zero-sum gamestwo-person noncooperative games
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