Manipulation and the Pareto rule
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Publication:1136592
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90053-XzbMath0427.90006MaRDI QIDQ1136592
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (24)
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. ⋮ Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems ⋮ On the manipulation of social choice correspondences ⋮ A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules ⋮ The Pareto rule and strategic voting ⋮ The ordering importance measure of random variable and its estimation ⋮ Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules ⋮ Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule ⋮ Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
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