Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF00935475zbMath0426.90095MaRDI QIDQ1136708

E. Tse, Akira Namatame

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryNash equilibriumnoncooperative gameincomplete informationdecision behavioradaptive expectationsadjustment processesstability of differential equations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (5)

Existence of competitive equilibria via Smith's nonlinear complementarity result ⋮ The Cournot oligopoly and competitive equilibria as solutions to nonlinear complementarity problems ⋮ Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms ⋮ A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism ⋮ Aggregative variational inequalities

Cites Work

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• Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
• Non-cooperative games
• A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem
• Nash Equilibrium Strategies for the Problem of Armament Race and Control
• State equation, controllability, and maximal matchings of petri nets
• A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race
• Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour

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