A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations

DOI10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7zbMath0426.92025OpenAlexW2048876447MaRDI QIDQ1136727

Henry J. Landau, Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsupergamesocial equilibriumsocial Darwinism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Mathematical psychology (91E99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (9)

Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ Anonymous sequential games ⋮ Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002) ⋮ A model of far-sighted electoral competition ⋮ Reputation and imperfect information ⋮ Bargaining with history-dependent preferences ⋮ Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment ⋮ Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning

Cites Work

• Finite state Markovian decision processes
• The Bargaining Problem
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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