Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90027-9zbMath0427.90092OpenAlexW2008328211MaRDI QIDQ1136947

Joseph Greenberg

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90027-9

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining setcoalition formationblocking coalitionsbehavioral analysispsi-stabilitystable payoffsstructural equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set ⋮ Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of theHeiseimunicipal amalgamations

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments

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