Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90036-XzbMath0431.90009OpenAlexW2055169496MaRDI QIDQ1138466

James M. Enelow

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90036-x

zbMATH Keywords

social choicestrategic manipulationindividual decision rulesmulti-valued collective choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities

Cites Work

• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

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