Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90038-1zbMath0438.90015OpenAlexW2060996958MaRDI QIDQ1142147

Edward J. Green

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90038-1

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolynoncooperative gamesclosed graphnonatomic gamessupergameinfinitely many playerssupergame equilibriaexchange economies with many participantslarge competitive marketsmaximization of asymptotic average payoffrepetition of gamesreplica sequences of gamestotal variation norm topology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (24)

Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome ⋮ Large strategic dynamic interactions ⋮ Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players ⋮ Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets ⋮ A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts ⋮ Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games ⋮ Strategic market games: an introduction. ⋮ Bad apples in symmetric repeated games ⋮ Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions ⋮ Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards ⋮ Analysis of Markovian competitive situations using nonatomic games ⋮ College assignment as a large contest ⋮ A strong anti-folk theorem ⋮ Large nonanonymous repeated games ⋮ Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: An example ⋮ Strategic behavior in non-atomic games ⋮ Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes ⋮ When are nonanonymous players negligible? ⋮ Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets ⋮ Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market ⋮ Pivotal players and the characterization of influence ⋮ Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames

Cites Work

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• Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Cournot and Walras equilibrium
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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