Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01769765zbMath0438.90114OpenAlexW1977879492MaRDI QIDQ1142163

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1980

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769765

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationequilibrium pointHarsanyi-Selten solution theorytwo-person bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. I: Theoretical preliminaries ⋮ Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. II: Analysis of specific bargaining games ⋮ Bargaining under strike: A differential game view ⋮ Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games

This page was built for publication: Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information