A class of power indices for voting games

DOI10.1007/BF01771427zbMath0447.90094OpenAlexW2016508546MaRDI QIDQ1146622

Edward M. Bolger

Publication date: 1980

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01771427

zbMATH Keywords

self-dualitysymmetry conditionssemivaluessimple gamepower indicesShapley-Shubik indexvoting gamesBanzhof indexsupport-independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Characterizing the Banzhaf and Shapley values assuming limited linearity ⋮ The Power of a Spatially Inferior Player

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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